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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the notice of interest recorded by Allan
G. Birch constituted a wrongful lien and whether the filing of a Petition to Nullify a
Wrongful Lien, signed by counsel for the record interest holder, and supported by
the sworn affidavit of the record interest holder complies with the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7?

Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. John Wagner
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 191 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the legal conclusions as
to the ultimate question of two lay witnesses and concluding, based on the testimony
of a qualified physician and the testimony of the alleged incapacitated, that such
person was not incapacitated?.

Standard of Review: Whether a lay witness can state an opinion rests almost altogether
in the judicial discretion of the trial judge. In re Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 94 (Utah 1985)
(quoting In re Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 1103, 1115-16 (Utah 1935). The district court's
factual findings, regarding whether Bernard J. Myers was an incapacitated person, is
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996).

1

Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake

3.

Whether the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to approve a petition for
formal probate and formal appointment of personal representative when an estate
has assets at the time of the decedent's death, but ^ portion of such assets are
distributed and it is disputed as to whether the estate has assets at the time of
approval of the Petition for Formal Probate and Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative?

Standard of Review:

The determination of whether a court has subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v.
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,1J 8, 31 P.3d 1147.
4.

Whether the district court had authority to modify a stipulated order when the
express language of the order, which was agreed to as ^o form by all parties, allowed
for such modification?

Standard of Review: Interpretation of an order of the district court is a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadows Hdme Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch
County, 2001 UT App 414, f 7, 40 P.3d 1148. The District Court possesses inherent
authority to modify its own order.

2

5.

Does a vague reference to an issue, without further evidentiary support or the
support of relevant legal authority preserve such issue for appeal?

Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. John Wagner
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
6.

Whether the district court correctly dismissed Birch Brothers' complaint, when
every issue raised in the complaint was either moot or was fully adjudicated during
the course of the bench trial?

Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. John Wagner
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
7.

Whether the Birch Brothers9 appeal is frivolous under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure?
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.

8.

Did the district court's reduction of attorney fees, after previously awarding the full
amount of attorney fees, without providing any basis for the reduction constitute a
clear abuse of discretion?

Standard of Review: "Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion
of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse
of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation
omitted).

3

Issue Preserved: Issue was preserved by Affidavit of Attorney Fee (R. at 348-354.) and
Petition for Wrongful Lien (R. at 140).
9.

Did the trial court err in rescinding the award of statutory damages in the amount of
$1000.00, which award is mandatory under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4?

Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness. See Eastern
Utah Broad v. Labor Comm% 2007 UT App 99, f 5, 158 P.3d 1115.
Issue Preserved: Issue was preserved by Affidavit of Attorney Fee (R. at 348-354.) and
Petition for Wrongful Lien (R. at 140).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien—Damages.
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(22).
"Incapacitated Person."

Utah Uniform Probate Code Definition of

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee and Cross-Appellant Bernard J. Myers ("Bernard") objects to Appellants
Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch (collectively the "Birch Brothers")
Statement of the Case, (Br. of Birch Brothers at 3-8), because it contains misleading and
argumentative assertions that unfairly distort the record below and states facts that were
not established below.
This case involves disputes related to the administration of the estate of Eva L.
Myers and the administration of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable
Living Trust, dated November 29, 2005 (the "Trust"). The Trust was established for the

4

purpose of providing for the financial needs of Eva L. Myers ("Eva") and Bernard J.
Myers ("Bernard") during their joint lifetimes and upon the death of the first to die, Eva
in this case, to provide for the needs of the survivor, Bernard. The Trust was funded by a
deed of the Blackhawk Property to the Trust, opening of joint Trust bank accounts and a
general assignment of all the property of Eva and Bernard. In the event there are any
assets left in the Trust after the death of the second to die, the remaining Trust assets are
to be distributed to the Birch Brothers and Gary Myers, Bernard's son, in accordance
with the terms of the Trust.
The primary source of contention in this case relates to a particular Trust asset, the
property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Utah (the "Blackhawk
Property"), which was Eva's home, before her marriage to Bernard, and became the
marital home of Eva L. Myers and Bernard J. Myers before Eva's death.

Upon

establishing the Trust, Eva conveyed the Blackhawk Property to the Trust. After Eva's
death, Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, no longer desired to live in the Blackhawk
Property, therefore he listed it for sale and purchased a smaller home to live in. The
Birch Brothers, Eva's children from a prior marriage, did not want the Blackhawk
Property to be sold. The Birch Brothers desire an early distribution of what they perceive
to be their future inheritance and want to prevent Trust assets from being expended for
Bernard's reasonable needs in accordance with the terms of the Trust.
In order to prevent the Blackhawk Property from being sold, the Birch Brothers
claimed that Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, did not possess the authority to sell the
Blackhawk Property. Upon discovering that Bernard had listed the Blackhawk Property
5

for sale, one of the Birch Brothers, Allan G. Birch, filed a notice of interest against the
Blackhawk Property in order to prevent the sale of the Blackhawk Property. Bernard
responded by filing a petition to nullify the notice of interest as a wrongful lien. The
Birch Brothers also filed a complaint seeking to prevent Bernard from selling the
Blackhawk Property by claiming he was mentally incapacitated and not able to serve as
trustee of the Trust. The Birch Brothers' action was subsequently consolidated with
Bernard's probate action.
A hearing was held on the wrongful lien and the district court determined that the
notice of interest was a wrongful lien and awarded Bernard the full amount of attorney
fees requested and statutory damages. In April of 2008, the district court, sua sponte and
without providing any facts or analysis for doing so, reduced the amount of attorney fees
previously awarded to Bernard and denied Bernard an award of statutory damages. This
reduction in the award of attorney fees and the denial of statutory damages forms the sole
basis of Bernard's cross-appeal. Allan G. Birch now claims on appeal that the district
court erred in determining that the notice of interest was a wrongful lien and the Birch
Brothers claim that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint.
The district court ordered the parties to mediation.

The mediation was

unsuccessful. As the remaining issues in this case, Bernard's incapacity and Bernard's
authority under the Trust to sell the Blackhawk Property, neared trial, the parties agreed
at a scheduling conference and motion hearing that the Blackhawk Property could be
sold. Therefore, the sole issue remaining for trial was whether or not Bernard was
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incapacitated and not able to serve as personal representative of Eva's estate and trustee
of the Trust.
After a two day bench trial, which included extensive testimony from Bernard and
testimony from his long-time physician, Dr. Margaret Lunt, the district court determined
that the Birch Brothers failed to meet their burden in establishing that Bernard was an
incapacitated person, appointed Bernard personal representative of Eva's estate and
dismissed the Eiirch Brother's complaint, which decision, as well as the district court's
decision related to the wrongful lien, led to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bernard was married to Eva L. Myers ("Eva"). (R. at 17.) On November 29,
2005 Bernard and Eva created the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living
Trust (the "Trust"). (R. at 63-84.) The Trust was funded by a deed of the Blackhawk
Property to Trust, the opening of Trust Accounts and a general assignment of all the
property of Eva and Bernard to the Trust. (R. at 86.) At the same time, Eva executed a
pour-over will (the "Will"), which devised all of Eva's property, not already in the Trust,
to the Trust. (R. at 92-96.) Also on November 29, 2005 Eva conveyed, by warranty
deed, that certain real property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley Utah (the
"Blackhawk Property") to the Trust. (R. at 177.) On May 29, 2007 Eva died. (R. at
179.)
On July 27, 2007 Bernard filed his Petition for Formal Probate of will and Formal
Appointment of Personal Representative (the "Petition for Formal Probate and
Appointment"). (R. at 1-12.) Bernard, through the filing of the Petition for Formal
7

Probate and Appointment, sought to be formally appointed personal representative of the
estate of Eva L. Myers ("Eva"), his deceased wife, and sought the formal probate of the
Will Id. On August 15, 2007 the Birch Brothers filed their Objection to Petition for
Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative (the
"Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment").

(R. at 16-19.) The

Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment opposed the appointment of
Bernard as personal representative by claiming that Bernard suffered from dementia and
would not be able to comprehend the procedures in law relative to the office of personal
representative. (R. at 16.)
In August of 2007 Bernard listed the Blackhawk Property for sale with Coldwell
Banker. (R. at 717, 17I23-24.)1 In an attempt to prevent Bernard from selling the
Blackhawk Property, on August 15, 2007 Allan G. Birch filed a Notice of Interest in Real
Property (the "Notice of Interest") claiming an interest in the property as an heir and
named personal representative of Eva's estate. (R. at 205.) Bernard, not Allan G. Birch,
is the named personal representative under the Will. (R. at 93.)
On August 29, 2007, Bernard, as trustee of the Trustb by and through counsel, sent
a Request to Release the Notice of Interest (the "Request to Release"). (R. at 207-208.)
On September 26, 2007, more than 10 days after the Request to Release was sent,
Bernard, filed his Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien (the "Petition to Nullify") and in

The Record cite for transcripts contains a single number for the entire transcript, therefore the
record is cited by number followed by the specific page number and line number. For example
the entire January 30, 2008 is cited as record number 718 therefore the cite (R. at 718, 6:1117) refers to page 6 lines 11-17 of Record 718.
8

accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, served the Petition to Nullify upon
Edward Garrett, counsel of record for Allan G. Birch. (R. at 131-141,) The Petition to
Nullify was supported by the sworn affidavit of Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, the
record interest holder. (R. at 124-130.) The Petition to Nullify came before the district
court for hearing on October 15, 2007 (the "Wrongful Lien Hearing"). (R. at 317.)
The sole argument raised in the district court by Allan G. Birch was that the
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien because Allan G. Birch had a vested interest in
the Blackhawk Property. (R. at 251-257, R. at 717, 11:11-15.) At the conclusion of the
Wrongful Lien Hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (R. at 317.)
On October 25, 2007 the district court issued a minute entry order as follows, "now being
fully advised orders the petition to nullify wrongful lien is granted." (R. at 338.)
Over a month later, on December 3, 2007, the district court entered its Findings of
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers5 Petition to Nullify
Wrongful Lien (the "First Lien Order") awarding statutory damages in the amount of
$1,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount.of $11,738.00. (R. at 391-394.) The First
Lien Order found, in pertinent part, that: (1) Allan G. Birch has a future interest in the
Trust, which is subject to total divestment and does not hold a vested interest in the
Blackhawk Property (R. at 393); and (2) Allan G. Birch does not have the right to
possess, use, or convey the Blackhawk Property; therefore, Allan G. Birch is not an
owner of the Blackhawk property. Id.
Almost six months after the Wrongful Lien Hearing, on April 7, 2008, the district
court entered its second Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting
9

Bernard J. Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien reducing the award of attorneys fees
to $7,700.00 and rescinding the award of statutory damages, which award was previously
entered pursuant to the First Lien Order. (R. at 676-679.)
Two weeks after the minute order held that the notice of interest constituted a
wrongful lien, on November 15, 2007, Allan G. Birch filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Minute Order Nullifying the Wrongful Lien (the "Motion to Reconsider"). (R. at
365-371.) Despite being notified, on multiple occasions, that a notice to submit had
never been filed with respect to the Motion to Reconsider, Allan G. Birch never filed a
notice to submit the Motion to Reconsider. (R. at 480.)
Allan G. Birch now claims, for the first time in this appeal, other than through the
Motion to Reconsider that was never submitted for decision, that: (1) Bernard did not
sign the petition and did not verify the same by Affidavit (Br. of Appellant at 9); (2) the
Petition to Nullify was never served on Allan G. Birch (Br. of Appellant at 10); and (3)
that Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. does not apply to the Notice of Interest (Br. of
Appellant at 10.)
Two months after Bernard filed his Petition for Fornjial Probate and Appointment,
on September 27, 2007, the Birch Brothers filed a complaint naming Bernard and John
Does 1-4 as defendants and captioned as case number 070913976 (the "Birch
Complaint"). (R. of case 070913976 at 1-5.) The complaint asserted the following three
causes of action: (1) that Bernard was incapacitated and not competent and therefore
should be removed as trustee of the Trust; (2) that Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, did not
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possess the authority to sell the Blackhawk Property; and (3) conversion of the
Blackhawk Property. (R. of case 070913976 at 3-4.)
A month after the filing of the Birch Complaint, on November 7, 2007, Bernard
filed a motion to consolidate case numbers 073901141 and 070912976. On January 4,
2008 the district court granted Bernard's motion to consolidate, thereby consolidating
case number 073901141 and 070913976.
On September 20, 2007, Bernard filed Petitioner's Motion for Hearing on
Competency and Petition for Interpretation of the Myers Estate Planning Documents (the
"Petition of Interpretation") requesting that the district court determine that the Trust
grants Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, the authority to sell the Blackhawk Property.
(R. at 41-42.) The Petition for Interpretation came before the district court for oral
argument on January 30, 2008 (the "Hearing on Interpretation of the Trust). (R. at 494.)
At Hearing on the Interpretation of the Trust, the district court asked the parties
whether an agreement could be reached with respect to what to do with the Blackhawk
Property. (R. at 718, 6:17-22.) The parties then agreed as follows:
The Court: Are you in agreement that the house should be
sold and the proceeds kept—
Mr, Alderman (counselfor Bernard): Yes.
The Court: -and maintained in the future?
Mr. Garrett (counsel for the Birch Brothers): Yes.
(R. at 718, 9:18-22.)
With respect to the proceeds upon a sale of the Blackhawk Property, the parties
agreed as follows*
11

The Court ...Then let's go ahead and I assume you're in
agreement we can order it [the sales proceeds] be placed in an
account that can't be withdrawn without consent of both
parties and they'd have to each sign.
Mr. Alderman: That'd be fine, Your Honor.
The Court: Or court order. Okay?
Mr. Garrett: That's the underlying point there, Your Honor,
that before any of it could be withdrawn, it must be shown
that there is a need on the part of the petitioneil.
The Court: Well, I would assume that Vou're both in
agreement that the money ought to be withdrawn that that
condition would be met. I would also make the assumption
that if you don't agree to have it withdrawn and you can
know you can come to the Court for the court orders, we'll
cross that bridge on that day for whatever the need may or
may not be and then I can make the ultimate determination as
to whether or not the funds should be withdrawn.
Mr. Garrett: That's fine.
(R. at 718, 11:18-25 through 12:1-11.)
Pursuant to the above described agreement, on Match 3, 2008 the district court
entered the Order for Sale of Home, Denying Motion to Dismiss and Denying
Petitioner's Motion to Interpret Trust (the "Order for Sal$"), the terms of which were
agreed to as to form by counsel for Allan G. Birch. (R. at 493-495.) Pursuant to the
Order for Sale, the district court ordered that the Blackhawk Property be sold and "the
proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 [of the Order for Sale] shall be placed in an
interest bearing account in the joint names of Gary layers and Allan Birch and
distributions from such account be made only pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties
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or further order of the Court for the benefit of Bernard Myers.

(R. at 494-495)

(emphasis added).
On March 14, 2008, Bernard filed his Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting
Distribution of Sales Proceeds to Trust (the "Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting
Distribution").

(R. at 539-540.)

The Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting

Distribution requested distribution of the sales proceeds to the Trust because the
Blackhawk Property was an asset of the Trust, therefore pursuant to the express terms of
the Trust, the proceeds of the sale of the Blackhawk Property, a Trust asset, must be
placed in the Trust and administered in accordance with the terms of the Trust. (R. at
540-551.)
On April 21, 2008, following a trial on the merits, the district court entered its
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers Petition for
Appointment as Personal Representative of the Eva L. Myers Estate and Dismissal of
Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch Against Bernard J. Myers,
Individually and as Named Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable
Trust and Does 1-4 (the "Final Order"). (R. at 683-687.) The Final Order, in pertinent
part, granted Bernard's Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting Distribution and
amended the Order for Sale by ordering the sales proceeds from the sale of the
Blackhawk Property to be distributed to the trustee of the Trust, Bernard, and
administered in accordance with the terms of the Trust. (R. at 686.)
The Birch Brothers now claim that the verbal agreement, described above, that
resulted in the Order for Sale, was not an order of the district court, but rather a
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stipulation of the parties and that the district court lacks the authority to modify a
"stipulation" of the parties. (Br. of Birch Brothers at 8.)
A bench trial was conducted on the merits on April 1 through April 2 of 2008
("Trial") to fully adjudicate the Birch Complaint and the Petition for Formal Probate and
Appointment. Because the district court ordered that the Blafckhawk Property be sold, the
district court determined that the sole issue that remained for trial, in order to fully
adjudicate the Birch Complaint and the Petition for Formil Probate and Appointment,
was whether Bernard was an incapacitated person and Enable to serve as personal
representative of Eva's estate and as trustee of the Trust. (R. at 719, 5:14-24.)
At Trial the district court had ample opportunity to determine for itself whether
Bernard was an incapacitated person and not able to serve as personal representative and
trustee of the Trust as Bernard testified extensively on matters involving the
administration of the Trust, Eva's estate and the administration thereof, management of
Bernard's personal financial affairs, as well as the financial affairs of the trust and
Bernard's ability to manage the affairs of his daily life. (1^. at 719-720, 246-297, 393419.)
Bernard's personal physician, Dr. Margaret Lunt, testified that: (1) she had seen
Bernard between two and four times a year for the past eight or nine years; (2) that
Bernard was capable of giving informed consent—the ability to make a decision based on
the facts presented that will impact him and others; (3) Bernard has the ability to weigh
different options and make decisions; and (4) she administered a mini-mental exam to
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Bernard, a screen for dementia, in the fall of 2007 and Bernard scored a 30 out of 30. (R.
at 719, 127-128.)
Bernard's son, Gary Myers, and his daughter-in-law, Jane Myers, testified as to
Bernard's ability to successfully perform a variety of activities and his ability to
successfully manage financial affairs. (R. at 720, 297-393.)
At the conclusion of Trial, the district court found the testimony of Dr. Margaret
Lunt credible and further found that her testimony, that Mr. Myers is medically
competent and does have the mental ability to process information and make informed
decisions, persuasive and the district court accepted such testimony and recommendation
from a qualified physician in that regard. (R. at 720, 432: 24-25 through 433:1-4.) The
district court further found that Bernard, as a result of the testimony that was heard, is not
impaired and that the Birch Brothers failed to meet their burden of proving that Bernard
is incapacitated. (R. at 720,433:5-16.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Birch Brother's have failed to establish that the district court erred in

determining that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien. The issues raised in the
Birch Brother's appeal were not preserved because the Birch Brothers failed to file a
request to submit their Motion for Reconsideration and did not otherwise raise the
arguments made in their appellate brief before the district court. Therefore this Court
should affirm the trial court's decision as it relates to the wrongful lien
2.

No legal authority exists to support the proposition advanced by the Birch

Brothers that a petition for appointment of a personal representative and probate of a will
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should be dismissed if the estate of a deceased person h^s no assets and no factual
support exists in the record to support the Birch Brothers unsubstantiated assertion that
Eva's estate did not have any assets at the time of her deaths therefore the district court's
denial of the Birch Brothers' motion to dismiss the Petition for Formal Probate and
Appointment should be upheld.
3.

The Birch Brothers' argument that the district court lacked the authority to

modify a stipulation is without merit because the agreement embodied in the district
court's Order for Sale, which was agreed to as to form by counsel for the Birch Brother,
expressly provided that the proceeds from the sale of the Blackhawk Property would not
be distributed other than by joint agreement or further order of the district court.
4.

The district court's determination that Bernard was not an incapacitated

person should be upheld because it was supported by substantial and competent evidence.
5.

The unsubstantiated allegation that Bernard repioved $7,516.72 from Eva's

account, a Trust account, cannot form a basis for an appeal because a vague and arguable
reference to a point in the district court proceeding does not preserve the issue on appeal.
6.

The district court's Order of Sale mooted all blaims presented in the Birch

Complaint, except for the issue of Bernard's incapacity to serve as trustee, which was
adjudicated at the Trial, therefore the district court's dismissal of the Birch Complaint
should be upheld.
7.

The Birch Brothers rely on facts not in the record, failed to marshal the

evidence and make arguments in direct contravention of established Utah case law and
Utah statutes, therefore the Birch Brothers' appeal is frivolous and Bernard is entitled to
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an award of attorney fees and double costs pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
8.

The trial court abused its discretion by reducing the attorney fees originally

awarded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 and the court's Finding of Facts,
Conclusions of law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful
Lien initially entered on December 3, 2007, by sua sponte and without providing any
explanation in the reducing the amount of fees awarded.
9.

The trial court erred in rescinding the award of statutory damages in the

amount of $1,000.00 previously awarded on December 3, 2007 and mandated by Utah
Code Ann. §38-9-4.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTICE OF
INTEREST CONSTITUTED A WRONGFUL LIEN WAS IN STRICT
CONFORMANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANN, §38-9-1 ET SEP. AND
THEREFORE SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The Birch Brothers assert that the district court erred in ruling that the Notice of

Interest was a Wrongful Lien because: (1) The Petition to Nullify was signed by counsel
for Bernard; (2) The Petition to Nullify was not verified by affidavit; (3) The Petition to
Nullify was not served upon Allan G. Birch, but rather was served upon counsel for Allan
G. Birch; (4) an amendment to Utah Code § 38-9-1 et seq., excepted a notice of interest
from the purview of the statute; and (5) Allan G. Birch is an interest holder. (Br. of
Appellant at 9-14.)
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Arguments one through 4 presented above, aside from lacking merit, were not
preserved on appeal, because none of the arguments were raised before the district court,
as the Motion for Reconsideration never came before the district court because it was
never submitted to the district court as required by Rule 7(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The sole argument raised in the district court b^ Allan G. Birch was that the
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien because Allan G. Birch had a vested interest in
the Blackhawk Property. (R. at 251-257, R. at 717, 11:11-15.) Allan G. Birch did file a
Motion to Reconsider, raising a portion of the issues raised in this appeal for the first
time, but a request to submit for decision was never filed in the district court. (R. at 480.)
Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that, "If
no party files a request [request to submit], the motion will not be submitted for
decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d). Therefore, because issues one through four, described
above, were neither raised in Allan G. Birch's objection to the Petition to Nullify nor
during the hearing on the wrongful lien, but rather were rrierely raised in the Motion to
Reconsider, which was never submitted, issues one through four were not preserved for
appeal.
In the alternative, in the event this Court determines such issues were properly
preserved, each of the issues raised by Allan G. Birch with respect to the district court's
determination that the Notice of Interest was a Wrongful Lien, lacks merit.
First, Allan G. Birch, without any authority, claims that the Petition to Nullify was
not signed by Bernard and was not supported by an affidavit, therefore it is ineffectual in
stating a claim to nullify a wrongful lien. Rule 11(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure provides, "Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented, by the party. Utah R.
Civ. P. 11(a). Because Bernard was represented by counsel, Rule 11 required that the
Petition to Nullify be signed by one of his attorneys of record and if Bernard had signed
the Petition to Nullify, it would have been a violation of the Rule 5(b)(1) of Civil
Procedure. Further, Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1 et seq. does not contain a requirement that
a petition to nullify a wrongful lien be signed by the record interest holder, as opposed to
counsel for the record interest holder, therefore the Birch Brothers' argument that the
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien because the Petition to Nullify was signed by
counsel, is frivolous.
Second, the Petition to Nullify was supported by the sworn affidavit of Bernard, as
trustee of the Trust, the record interest holder and each and every factual statement
contained in the Petition to Nullify was supported by Bernard's sworn affidavit. (R. at
124-136.) Therefore, the Birch Brother's claim that [the record interest holder] did not
verify the same by Affidavit is wholly inaccurate. (Br. of Appellant at 9.)
Third, Utah Code Ann. §3 8-9-7(3)(c) provides, "The record interest holder shall
serve a copy of the petition on the lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process." Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides, "If a party is represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon
the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. P.
5(b)(1). In this case Edward Garret was, and remains, the attorney of record for Allan G.
Birch and the district court did not order that service be perfect in a manner other than
19

pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. K loreover, there is I Jtah jurisprudence
diic^Liv on point to this issue. Because service dii ectly upon a represented par t:> \ v c iild
\ iolatc an attorney 's etl ileal di ities ai id w 01 lid be inconsistent with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, sen ice oi'a petition lor a wrongful lien must be made upon the attorney for
the lien claimant

.ve {..ententtn- , . •

*,.

NuttalL

\f i
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Fourth, although the amendments to § 38-9-1 et seq. cannot apply retroactively to
dcn\ J partx of his rights, thai were prc\J«.'Usly awarded 1\\ Ihc disincl u>ur' Ml n G
Unci, ini.-vstaie^ the purpose A ^ _UW* ank. .ainu..
Utal 1 Code ^\ i n 1 § 38 9 1 w as amended for the pi irpo;

ui making ii explicitly ueai wiiai

Utah courts ha\e lone held, that a notice of interest is a wrongful lien. Section 18-0 •('>).
as amenuLu *.-• ut JUihS ^cnuai oc^um. ,jio\kko tlua a. *A\iunglu» JKII aieans any

interest in cerium real property. . . .

^lak Code Ann. £ 38-9-1 (6) (2008;. More^.ei

Utah courts, even before the express inclusion of a notices of interest in the definitioi i of

notice of interest was not authorized by statute, a notice of interest constitutes a wrongful
lien. See Russell v. Thomasf 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244; Commercial Inv. Corp. v.
Stgfri*.
Fifth, Allan G. Birch does not possess a vested ownership interest in the
Blackhawk Property, therefore the Notice of Interest constitutes a wrongful lien, I Jtah
C otu. Ann. s --• • o* . definedawrongu.il

en as:
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any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance
on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time
it is recorded or filed is not:
(a)

expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or
federal statute;

(b)

authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or

(c)

signed by or authorized pursuant to a document
signed by the owner of the real property.

Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (6)(2007) (emphasis added).
Allan G. Birch does not claim that the Notice of Interest is not a wrongful lien
because he is an owner of the Blackhawk Property, but rather claims the Notice of
Interest is not a Wrongful Lien because he is a beneficial owner or an "Interest Holder."
Allan G. Birch further claims to have a vested interest in the Blackhawk Property, but
does not claim to have a vested ownership interest in the Blackhawk Property, as required
by Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(3). Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(3) defines an owner as, "a
person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property." Utah Code Ann.
§38-9-1(3) (emphasis added). "Vested ownership" is defined as Ownership in which
title is perfect; absolute ownership."

Black's Law Diet, at 1131 (7th ed. 1999).

"Ownership" is defined as "The collection of rights allowing one to use and enjoy
property, including the right to convey it to others." Id.
Consistent with the district court's First Lien Order, Allan G. Birch possesses a
future interest in the Trust, which is subject to total divestment and does not hold a vested
interest in the Blackhawk Property. (R. at 393.) The Blackhawk Property was an asset of
the Trust, Allan G. Birch is a contingent beneficiary of the Trust, but does not possess
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any current right to any particular asset held b> tl le Trust or Trust income. Allan G.
Hii'di did not June the right lo use or cnjo) Ihc Biackkmk 1'iopnh Hi I iillmit i nn<

ill!

tl: ie ti : fc n: e /:\ Hi u: , G Bii :1 ,. was not an owner of the Blackhawk P n M V I V within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(3),. To hold otherwise would sanction precisely the
type wi nusuuci ihv. Utah Wrongful I Jen Statute seeks to prevent

1 he uusiei ol a HUM

by Utah Code Ann >^~"M03(iXh;> ^ manage the assets in accordance with the l a m s
of the Trust and the prudun investor ni«,

, ^^.i .onhngeu L^ijcliuai) w. ,i ! rust were

i

I III|H HI

tj i e assets of the trust, the trustee of the trust would be required to obtain the consent of
the contingent beneficiaries before selling trust assets and reinvesting them in accordance
\* It'll the best intebeneficiaries of a trust. Such a result is clearly contrary to the purpose of having a trustee
and contrary to the policy and purpose of Utah's wrongful lien statute.
For the reasons stated above, Allan < i liiuli :. appeal nl I he h r . l I 1V11 i Nilri a.
w ithoi it merit and the First Lien Order should be upheld.
H-

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF THE BIRCH BROTHERS'
MOTION TO DISMISS IS UNSUPPORTED BV THE UTAH PROBATE
CODE AND CITES FACTS NOT IN THE RECORD, THEREFORE THE
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE
EVEN AN ESTATE WITHOUT ASSETS MUST BE PROBATED .
The Hind. Hrothers filed a Motion ! r I Hsmiss "ii November 2H. ?i)\*x vi'i—u*

citing an;, icg.,

:

*•.:., s-

I

Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment must be dismissed (R at 382-385.)
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First, the Birch Brothers fail to satisfy their marshalling duty as they have failed to
provide any support in the record for their conclusion that Eva's estate did not possess
any assets. There is no requirement under the Utah Uniform Probate Code that an estate
be solvent before a personal representative can be appointed, yet the Birch Brothers claim
that Bernard was required to prove that there were assets in Eva's estate before he could
be appointed as personal representative. The Birch Brothers conceded that at the time of
Eva's death, Eva's estate had personal property and other assets. (Br. of Appellant at 13,
14.)
Furthermore, if Part V of the Birch Brother Appellate Brief had merit, the claim
that Eva had $7,516.72 in a non-trust account, those fund would be subject to probate,
thereby mooting Part II of the Birch Brothers' Appellate Brief, the claim that Eva's estate
did not have any probate assets. The Birch Brothers' are speaking out of both sides of
their mouths. In one breath they make a claim that Bernard took $7,516.72 from Eva's
account, a claim that was vaguely made and never pursued in the district court, and in the
next breath they claim that Eva's probate estate contained no assets therefore the district
court erred in failing to dismiss the Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment.
Clearly, both claims cannot be true.
Second, the Birch Brothers' argument is circular because a person cannot
investigate the extent of the estate until such person is appointed as personal
representative of the estate and given the powers associated with such appointment.
Without the powers commensurate with being appointed as a personal representative, a
person is incapable of ascertaining the location and extent of the assets of an estate. For
23

example, a bank will not disclose information as textile existence of an account or the
extent of the assets in an account,- absent presentniei it c f letters testamentary, * hich are
--• "

....**

-....,.

-iresentative.

Therefore, until a

personal representathc i- -ippomu d n ^annol he determined, with any degree of
certain! \. iik. nature and extent o\ .» w^^-.K>VM S assets.
Second, III ' ilul'i I'l i.n prrsoiiiil nr|»n sciilnliu i, IIIIIHII r -,< IIISIN v\\ in ulirJi iliiilli llln
assets of an estate. Some of the duties of the personal representative are: (1) to take
possession ar.*J control ~ r *u~ decedent's pror~rt^

TTt

ah Code \r~

§75-3-708;

Code Aim. % 7:>-J-VU 3: \ l) publish notice to creditor Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-801, and ic
satisfy the bona fide claims of creditors.
Even if an estate is • ' Itl: ic i it asse ts because si i :li assets wei e distrit i ited p :: st
mortem., as is claimed here, a personal representative's duties are not limited to acting in
the best interest of heirs and devisees. A personal, representative must also po.si IM-'I^
and satisfy the bona fide claims of creditors ' I he issue of w hethei Ev a' s estate has assets

death of a decedent and includes a review of pre-death transfers,
i ui me reasons stated abo\ e, the district court's denial of the Bii ch Brother's
MHi'""ii («i Dismiss siinitH h uplirlil
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III.

THE ORDER FOR SALE WAS A STIPULATED COURT ORDER,
NONETHELESS
THE
DISTRICT
COURT
POSSESSES
THE
AUTHORITY TO MODIFY ITS OWN ORDER.
The Birch Brothers argument that the district court erred in annulling the

stipulation of the parties by amending the Order for Sale is frivolous because no
stipulation was ever entered into not to modify the Order for Sale and the Final Order was
issued in accordance with the express terms of the Order for Sale.
First, the Birch Brothers' claims that a stipulation was reached as a result of
mediation is troublesome for the very reason that a stipulation was never entered into by
the parties during the course of mediation.

The parties reached an agreement at a

hearing, which was embodied in the Order for Sale. This is more than apparent from a
reading of the transcript of the hearing in which the agreement regarding the sale of the
Blackhawk Property was reached. See (R. at 718, 11:18-25, 12:1-11.)
Second, the Birch Brothers, in violation of the confidentiality requirements of
mediation, attempt to assert that a stipulation was reached, impliedly during mediation,
and the Order for Sale is an embodiment of such stipulation. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8
(Supp. 2007) provides that mediation proceeding are designed to "encourage[] informal
and confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate resolution of the
dispute." Utah Code Ann. §78-3 lb-8 (Supp. 2007).

"Confidentiality

of all

communications between the parties or among them and the mediator serves the
important public policy of promoting a broad discussion of potential resolutions to the
matters being mediated."

Wilmington Hospitality, L.L.C v. New Castle County, 788

A.2d 536, 541 (Del. Ch. 2001).
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Third, Utah Code Ann

§ 78-31 b-7(3)(a) (Supp. 2007) provides that "any

settl.em.ent agreement bet \ veeii the par ties as a i esi ill; : f 11 lediatioi 1 i i: iay be e :: i:e c .1 ite d in: 1
w riting. file d w itl 1 tl le clerk of the court, and enforceable as a judgment of the court."
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated:
...only agreements executed .n vsnung wn, no enforceable
as a judgment of the court." A court cannot enforce the terms
of an oral agreement reached in mediation without requiring
parties to disclose, and the court to consider, confidential
settlement negotiations. Absent the existence of an exception,
we ai c not pr epa.it •
invade t!^ * onfidentiality
protections afforded parties to mediation in this manner. A
rule permitting courts to enforce only written mediation
agreements operates in tandem., with tl: i..e n il.es providing
mediation confidentiality.
Reese v. Tingey Constr. 2008 UTSC 20060594 - 0201.08 (emphasis added).

to prepare a comprehensive, final settlement agreement free from misunderstandings and
ambiguities. This ' . Uicularly important in the mediation context where "parties are
often encouraL.

,

"informal atmospiiere * whcic parlies need to be iwmmUcd oi the import ol Jieir final
nods of assent (and] sitminu a wrilinjz is a iniplo forntalih that most people under land
as a 1 ..iUuiuac.

Vernon \ Aciun

...i. ; ;^a^,i,. ;./;,,., _ v ; Meu.Mca •settlement Agreement.

1

>2 N.h 2d So

MlU ilnd. 2iMM)> ("'Requiring written agreements,

signed by the parties, is more like!; to nuniitam mediation as a viable avenue f or clear
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and enduring dispute resolution rather than one leading to further uncertainty and
conflict.")
It is clear from the above quoted sources that if this Court were to entertain mere
claims that a purported "stipulation" was achieved during mediation where the Birch
Brothers admil that no progress was made, mediation would lose all viability as an
effective dispute resolution mechanism.

Therefore, any claim that some sort of

"stipulation" was reached during mediation, must be disregarded.
Fourth, With respect to the proceeds upon a sale of the Blackhawk Property, the
parties agreed as follows:
The Court: . . . Then let's go ahead and I assume you're in
agreement we can order it [the sales proceeds] be placed in an
account that can't be withdrawn without consent of both
parties and they'd have to each sign.
Mr. Alderman: That'd be fine, Your Honor.
The Court: Or court order. Okay?
s

Mr. Garrett: That's the underlying point there, Your Honor,
that before any of it could be withdrawn, it must be shown
that there is a need on the part of the petitioner.
The Court: Well, I would assume that you're both in
agreement that the money ought to be withdrawn that that
condition would be met. I would also make the assumption
that if you don't agree to have it withdrawn and you can
know you can come to the Court for the court orders, we'll
cross that bridge on that day for whatever the need may or
may not be and then I can make the ultimate determination as
to whether or not the funds should be withdrawn.
Mr. Garrett: That's fine.
(R. at 718, 11,12:18-25,1-11.)
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Pursuant to the above described agreement, not a stipulation entered into as the

terms of which were agreed to as to form by counsel for Allan G. Birch. Pursuant to the
Order for Sale, the district court ordered that the Blackhawk Property be sold and "the
proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 shall be placed Ii 1 an ii iterest bear ing

account be made onh pursuant i** a i«unl simulation ol'ihe parties or further order - / ~ <•
.* ihi. ixiicjii i>i ikiiidiu M ; U , .^ n •; /; +95) (emphasis added).
< >!i 1^ I . m i l I III, !(H)K, I U T I M H I I

Distribution.

(R. at 539-540'.)

' M o d u l i lui S u m m i m

iuili'iiinil I ' u i u r . l i i u . '

' I he Motion . _ nummary Judgment Requesting

Distribution requested distribution ~ r *hr sales proceeds tr f V ^ r r t because the
. :.

••*.!'-

:- . .

- re fore pi lr

v% /

the trust, the proceeds of the sale of the Blackhawk Property, a I rust asset, must be
placed in lite Trust and administered in accordance with the terms of the Trust

I lie exf

.T \\

;,M.- .>' il.c Oidei lui Sale pi ,»* M> d iui a distribution of the sales

proceeds in a man net P * ^ie< ? lor by a future u*uii - id

'"his is precisely the authority

by winch ilit luwl * >rdci ordered the sales proceeds uom the sale oi UK, iblackhawk

the terms td the I ru>< ff< at 686.) In essence, the l;inal (»rder did ;• • annul the OiUei
foi Sale, which embodied the agreement of the parties, but rather was issued pursuant to
tl: ic c: xpress ten i is : f the Oi dei for Sale.
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Because counsel for the Birch Brothers agreed to terms of the Order for Sale and
the Final Order is consistent with the provisions of the Order for Sale, which was not a
stipulation between the parties achieved during mediation, the Birch Brothers arguments
lack merit.

Therefore the provisions o the District Court's Order pertaining to

distribution of the sale proceeds from the Blackhawk Property should be upheld.
IV.

THE FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, THAT
BERNARD IS NOT AN INCAPACITATED PERSON SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
Factual determinations of the trial court will not be disturbed unless they are

clearly erroneous. Van Dyke v. Chappell 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991) (citations
omitted). "In making such a determination, we consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court. We recite the facts in accordance with that standard.5' Id.
The Birch Brothers, in contravention of Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, have failed to marshal the evidence to show that the district court's factual
determination of Bernard's competency was clearly erroneous.
The Advisory Committee Notes to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provide, in pertinent part:
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys
must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly
discharge the marshalling duty, the challenger must present,
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists.
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" 24 advison conim. Notes (emphasis added) (citations

0! i litteci).

At Trial, the district court had ample opportunih to determine for ilsc-f wh. ':
Bernard was an incapacitated person.,, as 1: le testified extensb el) oi I n latter s in v ol v ing the
administration of the I n ist , i i lanagement of his own financial affairs as well as those of
the Trust and his ability to manage the affairs of his daily life. (R. at 720, 246-297 r ^93419.) Bernard's personal physician, I <i l> I HI aiet I nut, testified ina* • • -•• nud seen
Raiiiinl btlwrnii il1 H I ilium! II ii! 111111

i

Bernard could give informed consent

the ability to make a decision based on the facts

i II

presented that w:V. impact him and others: (3) has the ability to weigh different options

for dementia, in the fall of 2007 and Bernard scored a 30 out of 30. (R. ai ll'j, 127 ; ^ 3 . ,
Bernard's son, Gary Myers., and his daughter-in-law, Jane M^ers, testified as to Bernard's

affairs. (R. at 720, 297-393.)
At the conclusion of Trial, the district cou-' ~--.::d the testimony of Dr Margaret
Lunt credible ai id further foui id that hei testimony

that IV if

IV !> ei s is medicall}

competent and does have the mental ability > tc > process it lformatioi i and make infoi med
HHIX

persuasive and the court accepted such testimony and recommendation from a

qudi.iicu physician ii I tl mt regard, (R at ; '20, 432: 24 25, 433:1- 1 )
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the Birch Brothers failed to meet their burden of proving that Bernard is incompetent.
(R. at 720, 433:5-16.)
Except for a passing reference to the testimony of Dr. Lunt, the Birch Brothers
failed to present, in their appellate brief, even a shred of the above described competent
evidence, but instead focused on the testimony of their witnesses, a nurse and a social
worker who attempted to present their unqualified diagnoses that Bernard suffered from
dementia.
Further, the Birch Brothers cite as error the exclusion of testimony of Heather
Bittenger, a social worker, and Dee Horn, a nurse, that Bernard was incompetent. First,
the testimony of a lay witness is limited to opinions and inferences which are rationally
based on the witness's perception and helpful to the fact finder to clearly understand the
witness's testimony or to determine a fact in issue." -State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 547
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Lay witnesses, however, cannot tell the fact finder what result to
reach or give legal conclusions. Id. As applied to this appeal, the Birch Brothers cite as
error the district courts' exclusion of testimony of Heather Bittenger and Dee Horn as to
the ultimate determination, Bernard's incapacity. Clearly, lay witnesses cannot testify to
such matters, that determination is for the finder of fact.
Second, pursuant to In re Kessler:
But when there are some underlying facts from which the jury
could draw an inference of other than normal mental
condition, then whether there is sufficient foundation for the
expression of an opinion by the lay witness or whether such
opinion would be helpful to the jury rests almost altogether
in the judicial discretion of the trial judge.
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In re Kesler, 702 P.2d 86? 94 i Utah !'•>*-; ; moling In r<- Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 110~
1115-16(1 Hah 1 (.> b ) (emphasis addud).
TbiTdbiv «"11111 '»SSIHHIH IIK'K ^'i

funjvi |iii|.ii.|;i(i.iiii. I.1, J "JHIUI HI. 1 li.ii.i i

Heather Bittenger to state a conclusion, the trial court exclusion of conclusion testimony,
rests almost altogether in the judicial discretion of the trial court, As applied to tl lis case,
ha\r Lin mi mi m a r s h a l i i / u m l i i n l n i u 1 s i i l Y i n a i l I

ii|)| n i

determination that proper foundation existed to permit such a conclusion, let alone to
overcome the substantial discretion the district court possesses in determining whether to
perm*: me ciiii; : ,m

. .

. • imiwJ.y.

Because the d^trici couit 5 determination was supported by substantial evidence,
the Birch Brothers have failed to demonstrate that the district court's determination of
competency was dearly erroneous,
ilnii1 'Hwdad <!••

'•, d-r'--

Likewise, the Birch Biothus hau

iailul lo

• ; n' , , " hsni'li'-M sliirh discretion resls almost

altogether with the disinu unni m piecluding a social worker and a nurse from opining
as to the ulti.rn.ate question in u»^ v. r><-

IK district coui t's determination that Bernard is

ni 11 * I null iiH apacilad •* 1 (HTSOII SIIMIIIII 1 * upiirM.
V.

THE BIRCH BROTHERS' CLAIM THAT BERNARD REMOVED
$7,526.72 FROM EVA'S ACCOUNT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AND IS TOO VAGUE TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE ON
APPEAL.
Because there is no st'nporl in the record of the district court proceedings that

Bernard was not entitled to administer the $7,516.72 alleged to have been removed from
Eva's account, such claim is not preserved on appeal.
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First, "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it fmust be raised in a timely
fashion, must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of
consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal
authority; " State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, f8, 86 P.3d 759. Second, a "[v]ague,
arguable references to [a] point in the district court proceedings do n o t . . . preserve the
issue on appeal." Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 (10th Cir.
1993)(quotation omitted; alteration in original). "Similarly, we have held that where an
issue is raised but not pursued in the trial court, it cannot be the basis for the appeal." Id.
at 722. The sole reference to the Birch Brothers claim is contained in one question
during the Trial. (R. at 720, 296:11-16.) Further such claim was never pursued further.
Second, Bernard as the trustee of the Trust and as named personal representative
was entitled to administer the aforementioned funds. Therefore, even in the event the
Birch Brothers were capable of establishing that Bernard took charge of such funds from
Eva's account, as personal representative of the estate or trustee of the Trust, Bernard had
the authority to take charge of such funds.
Because the issue was not preserved or pursued in district court, such issue cannot
form a basis for this appeal.
VI.

EACH AND EVERY ISSUE CONTAINED IN THE BIRCH COMPLAINT
WAS EITHER MOOTED BY THE ORDER FOR SALE OR
ADJUDICATED AT TRIAL, THEREFORE THE BIRCH BROTHERS1
CLAIM OF ERROR IN DISMISSING THEIR COMPLAINT LACKS
MERIT.
The Birch Complaint asserted the following three causes of action: (1) that

Bernard was mentally incapacitated and therefore should be removed as trustee of the
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Trust; (2) that Bernard, as trustee of the Trust,, did not possess ilie authority to sell the
i,kK,.Jiu^k : v ••

; •*

conversion of the Blackhawk I 'roperty.

(R

of ca se

\s held h\ ihc dislnci coart, the Order for Sale mooted claims t\\ o and three of the
Bnci i oiiiplaiiit neeuuse tlu llu^n i.sothers agreed atK iMtu.r.imv>k Property could be
iiillil I i llcniaii! ih 1 irImi ,li i

Il III

Iimihf
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express authority to sell the Blackhawk Property and a claim for conversion could not
proceed. The sole claim alleged in the Birch Complaint that remained was the removal of

a\i.- Mon that Bciiiaid was mcuidlty incapacitated and unable to serve as trustee of the
1 rusi

The requisite level < r cumpetencv for service as a personal representative is

: - M\ 'os

me wiuci IUI bale, tu wlnUi counsel for the linen l3iuthcn> agreed iu as

to form, and the district court's determination that Bernard has sufficient mental can-u ii\
to serve as personal representative oi the estate of Eva, complete! \ adjudicaUu ui. -,» ms
raise'!1 in (lie Mirrli ( 'umpl.'iml
For the reasons stated above, the district court's dismissal of the Birch Complaint
should be upheld.
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VII.

PURSUANT TO RULE 33 THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD BERNARD
JUST DAMAGES, INCLUDING DOUBLE COSTS AND REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE EACH CLAIM CONTAINED IN THE
BIRCH BROTHERS5 APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS.
As demonstrated above, the Birch Brothers appeal contains arguments that are

directly contrary to established Utah jurisprudence and directly contrary to Utah statutory
law. Further, the Birch Brothers failed to marshal the evidence and their arguments are,
to a large extent, supported by purported facts not in the record and their arguments are
not supported by any legal authority. In essence, the Birch Brothers present the rulings of
the district court, fail to provide any support, either factual or legal, as to why the district
court erred and ask this Court to determine whether such arguments have any legal
support or factual support. The Birch Brothers failed to cite statutes, case law and facts
in the record that are directly in opposite to the position taken in this appeal.
Rule 33 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that
a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the
party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law.
Utah R.App. P. 33(a) & (b).
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As applied to this case, the Birch Brother have repeatedly asserted arguments
directly in opposite to Utah statutes and case law. Moreover, each argument advanced
contains facts not in evidence and each argument fails to cite to facts in the record that
are contrary to the Birch Brothers positions taken on appeal. Moreover, certain of the
Birch Brother's positions contain misstatements. For example, the Birch Brothers claim
that Bernard failed to file an affidavit in support of the Petition to Nullify.

Clearly,

Bernard's sworn affidavit was filed in the district court and each and ever fact stated in
the Petition to Nullify was supported by Bernard's affidavit. (R. at 124-130.) Therefore,
pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure this Court should award Bernard reasonable attorney fees and
double costs.
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OF ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT
PROVIDING ANY INDICATION OR EXPLANATION AS TO HOW IT
ARRIVED AT THE REDUCED AMOUNT CONSTITUTES A CLEAR
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The trial court's reduction of attorney fees previously awarded pursuant to the
court's Finding of Facts, Conclusions of law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers'
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien initially entered on December 3, 2007, without
providing any explanation for such reduction, constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. It is
acknowledged that, "calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of
the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation
omitted).
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While it is clear that a trial court has considerable discretion in calculating
reasonable attorney fees, the trial court must make findings to explain the reduction of
attorney fees and demonstrate that the court utilized the proper factors for reducing such
fees. Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 174 (Utah App. 1990). "We
have held that unless the court offers an explanation for the reduction of the attorney fees
requested in a case where there is adequate and uncontroverted evidence in the record to
support the fees, it abuses its discretion." Id. (citing Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v.
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d
514, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Dixie State Bank at 987-91.
As applied to this case, on November 7. 2007 counsel for Bernard J. Myers
submitted an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien
(the "Affidavit"), which provided a detailed description of the services performed, the
hourly rate of the attorneys and paralegal performing such services and the amount of
time expended by the respective attorney or paralegal in performing such services. (R. at
348-354) The Affidavit cited the four factors outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and its progeny and provided a
detailed analysis of each of the four factors.
The sole opposition to the amount of attorney fees requested by Bernard J. Myers
was an unsupported assertion contained in Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of
the Minute Order Nullifying the Notice of Interest and to Strike the Proposed Findings of
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Submitted by Bernard J. Myers filed on November
15, 2007 (the "Motion to Reconsider") (R. at 365-371.) The Motion to Reconsider states:
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Even further, the attorney fees requested by Parsons Behle &
Latimer are not reasonable. The attorneys in this case
prepared, filed and argued a motion before the Court. In no
way should this consume $11,000.00 of attorney's time, if it
did, then the time involved is not reasonable for this type of
proceeding. This conclusion is clearly evident on the
document submitted..
(R. at 370.)
The Motion to Reconsider is conclusory and provides no support for Allan G.
Birch's assertion that the attorneys fees requested were unreasonable. Id. Moreover, the
unsupported claim that the requested amount of attorney fees was unreasonable was
presented in a motion to reconsider, which was never submitted to the district court and
which the Utah Supreme Court has described as follows:
The filing of post judgment motions to reconsider has become
a common litigation practice, notwithstanding the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure's failure to authorize it and our previous
attempts to discourage i t . . . . [We] warned that this practice
could "seriously compromise" the position of a litigant.
Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, f 1, 135 P.3d 861.
On December 3, 2007, the trial court, presumably finding that the requested
amount of attorney fees were reasonable, awarded Bernard J Myers the full amount of
attorney fees requested (R. at 391-394.) On April 7, the trial court, sua sponte, entered a
second Finding of Facts, Conclusions of law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers'
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien (the "Second Lien Order"), which reduced the amount
of attorney fees previously awarded to Bernard J. Myers. (R. at 676-679.) The trial
court's Second Lien Order does not make findings to explain the reduction in attorney
fees nor does it demonstrate that it utilized the proper factors in reducing the fees.
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Because the Affidavit provided a detailed analysis of each of the four factors
outline in Dixie State Bank, Allan G. Birch failed to provide any support for his assertion
that the attorney fees were unreasonable and the trial court, after having made a
determination that the fees were reasonable, reduced such fees without any explanation;
the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorney fees.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BERNARD J. MYERS AN
AWARD OF STATUTORY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000.00.
The trial court erred in rescinding, without explanation, the December 3, 2007

award of statutory damages pursuant to the Second Lien Order. (R. at 679.) "The proper
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which we review for
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusion." Gutierrez v.
Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998).
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2) provides in pertinent part:
If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release
or correct the wrongful lien within ten days from the date of
written request from a record interest holder of the real
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known
address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record
interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages,
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and
costs.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2) (2007).
The plain language of the above quoted provision of the Utah Code Ann. makes
clear that a lien claimant is liable to the record interest holder, for the greater of
$1,000.00 or treble actual damages, to the record title holder. The language of the statute
is mandatory and not permissive, therefore the trial court does not have discretion, after
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finding that the recorded lien constituted a wrongful lien, to deny an award of the
damages mandated by the plain language of the statute.
Furthermore, in the case the trial court awarded $1,000.00 in statutory damages on
December 3, 2007 only to subsequently deny such award on April 7, 2007. (R. at 394,
679.) The trial court rescinded the award of statutory damages previously awarded on
December 3, 2007 and failed to make any findings of fact or provide any explanation for
such rescission. In any event, the language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9^4(2) is clear and
unambiguous in providing that if the trial court makes a determination that a recorded
lien, after the lien claimant has received a demand to release such lien and fails to release,
the lien claimant is liable to the record title holder for damages. Therefore the trial court
committed clear error by deny Bernard J. Myers an award of statutory damages.
X.

BERNARD IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS FEES RELATED TO
THE APPEAL OF THE WRONGFUL LIEN.
In addition to attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33, Bernard requests that he be

awarded his attorney fees and costs on appeal on the same basis as they were awarded at
the trial court. "This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award
attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially authorizes them." Salmon v. Davis
County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996). "In addition, when a party who received
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably
incurred on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quotations
and citations omitted).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the First Lien Order, the Order
for Sale and the Final Order in their entirety. Further, this Court should find that the trial
court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorney fees and reinstate the award
entered on December 3, 2007. The Court should reinstate the December 3, 2007 award of
statutory damages as the trial court committed clear error in interpreting Utah Code Ann
§ 38-9-4 in a manner contrary to its plain language.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2008.

/
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KENT B. ALDERMAN
DAVID R. HALL
MATTHEW D. COOK
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of December, 2008,1 caused to be served, via
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT BERNARD J. MYERS to:
EDWARD M. GARRETT
GARRET & GARRET
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84108

ADDENDUM OF APPELLEE
Addendum 1: Determinative Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien—Damages.
(1)
A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused
by the wrongful lien.
(2)
If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the
wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a record interest
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of the
lien claimant, Ihe person is liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
(3)
A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 389-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or having
reason to know that the document:
(a)

is a wrongful lien;

(b)

is groundless; or

(c)

contains a material misstatement or false claim.

Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(22).
"Incapacitated Person."

Utah Uniform Probate Code Definition of

(22) "Incapacitated person9' means any person who is impaired by reason of
mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs,
chronic intoxication, or other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions.

Addendum 2:

Order for Sale of Home, Denying Motion to Dismiss and Denying

Petitioner's Motion to Interpret Trust, dated March 3, 2008.

Addendum 3:

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J.

Myers Petition for Appointment as Personal Representative of the Eva L. Myers Estate
and Dismissal of Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch Against
Bernard J. Myers, Individually and as Named Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L.
Myers Revocable Trust and Does 1-4, dated April 21, 2008.

Addendum 4:

Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify

Wrongful Lien, dated November 7, 2007.

Addendum 5:

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J.

Myers5 Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, dated December 3, 2007.

Addendum 6:

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J.

Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, dated April 7, 2007.

ADDENDUM 2
Order For Sale of Home

FILEB DISTBICT COURT
Third Judicial District

KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

MAR - 3 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY

/~~J^jL_
Deputy Cferk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
EVA L. MYERS,

ORDER FOR SALE OF HOME,
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
TO INTERPRET TRUST

Deceased.
Probate No. 073901141
Judge Robert P. Faust
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L.
Myers Revocable Living Trust,
Petitioner,

ALLAN G. BIRCH,
Respondent.

Petitioner Bernard J. Myers ("Petitioner"), as named personal representative of the Estate

4839-2459-4434,1

A°&

of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers
and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, and Respondent Allan G. Birch came for oral
argument before the Honorable Robert P. Faust on January 30, 2008. Petitioner was represented
by Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Respondent Allan G. Birch ("Respondent")
was represented by Edward M. Garret of Garrett & Garrett.
After full consideration of the memoranda and petitions submitted by the Petitioner and
the Respondent, the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises and other good
cause shown, the Court hereby enters the following Order:
1.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by Allan G. Birch on November 20, 2007 is hereby

denied without prejudice to re-filing at a later date;
2.

The Motion to Vacate Trial Date filed by Allan G. Birch on January 15, 2008 is

hereby granted, but Petitioner Bernard J. Myers may file a motion with the Court to recover his
fees and expenses incurred in preparation for trial;
3.

Petitioner's Motion for Interpretation of the Myers Estate Planning Documents is

hereby denied for the time being, but may be resubmitted at a later date, if need be;
4.

The property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt Lake

County, Utah 84120 and more particularly described as follows: Lot 83, Western Acres
Subdivision No.2, according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of Salt Lake County Utah and with a Tax Parcel Number of 15321030140000 shall be
sold; and,

4839-2459-4434.1
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5.

The proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 shall be placed in an interest

bearing account in the joint names of Gary Myers and Allan Birch and distributions from such
account be made only pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties or further order of the Court
for the benefit of Bernard Myers.
BY THE COURT:

^A~-4^
Honorable Robert
Third Judicial District
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

'

'

°

jOhl^yl
Edward Garret
Attorney for Allan G. Birch
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ADDENDUM 3
Final Order

KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751)
Parsons Behle & Latimer
Attorneys for Petitioner Bernard J. Myers
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

Third Judicial District

APR 2 1 2008
By.

f SALT LAKE COUNTV
Deputy Cl^iT

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
EVA L. MYERS, deceased,
and
ALLAN G. BIRCH, GLENN L. BIRCH
and JAMES BIRCH,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BERNARD J. MYERS, individually and as
named as Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers
and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust
and Does 1-4,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION FOR
APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EVA L.
MYERS ESTATE AND DISMISSAL OF
COMPLAINT OF ALLAN G. BIRCH,
GLENN L. BIRCH AND JAMES BIRCH
AGAINST BERNARD J. MYERS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NAMED
TRUSTEE OF THE BERNARD J.
MYERS AND EVA L. MYERS
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND
DOES 1-4.
Probate No. 073901141
Civil Case No. 070913976

Judge Robert P. Faust

17203 001/4850-0830-8482 1

KsRA

The petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative under the Will of Eva L. Myers filed by Bernard Myers ("Bernard") and the
Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch (the "Birch Brothers") against
Bernard Myers in his individual capacity and as Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L.
Myers Revocable Living Trust (the "Trust") came on for trial on April 1 and 2, 2008 before the
Honorable Robert P. Faust. Bernard Myers was represented by Kent Alderman of Parsons Behle
& Latimer and the Birch Brothers were represented by Edward Garrett of Garrett and Garrett.
After considering the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits produced, the memorandum
and pleadings submitted by the parties and hearing arguments of counsel the Court hereby enters
its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

It was undisputed by the parties to these consolidated actions that the Trust was

duly executed by Bernard and Eva Myers on November 29, 2005.
2.

There were no facts presented by the parties that there was any invalidity in the

Trust documents or in its execution. The Trust was prepared with the aid of Bernard and Eva
Myers' attorneys.
3.

It was undisputed by the parties that the home located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive,

West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 84120 (the "Blackhawk Property") whose legal
description is as follows:
Lot 83 Western Acres Subdivision Number 2 according to the
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Record of
Salt Lake County, Utah and with a tax parcel of 1532103014000

17203.001/4850-0830-8482.1
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was deeded to the Trust by Warranty Deed signed by Eva L. Myers on November 25, 2005 and
recorded December 8, 2005.
4.

There were no facts or evidence presented indicating that the Warranty Deed was

5.

Bernard's physician Dr. Margaret Lunt, M.D. testified that she had tested

invalid.

Bernard's mental capacity and the result of that test was that there was no evidence of mental
impairment. In addition, her experience as his physician over the past nine years indicated that
he had sufficient understanding and mental capacity to make and communicate responsible
decisions including the ability to give informed consent, manage his financial affairs, and to
engage persons to assist him with personal, medical, and legal matters.
6.

The Birch Brothers' claims of an alleged oral agreement between Bernard Myers

and Eva Myers with respect to the disposition of the Blackhawk Property cannot be established
due to the requirement of Utah statutes governing the creation of interests in real property be in
writing and the Statute of Frauds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Bernard Myers and Eva L. Myers' Revocable Living Trust is a valid and

existing Trust under Utah law.
2.

The Blackhawk Property is owned by the Trust.

3.

Utah law provides that a 'Incapacitated person" means any person who is

impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use
of drugs, chronic intoxication or other cause except minority to the extent of lacking sufficient

17203.001/4850-0830-8482.1
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understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. The Birch Brothers
have failed to carry their burden of proof to establish that Bernard Myers is mentally
incompetent to act as the personal representative of the Eva Myers Probate Estate and to
continue acting as the Trustee of the Trust. Bernard Myers is not mentally impaired.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court being fully advised in the premises and for good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Bernard Myers is hereby appointed as personal representative of the Estate of Eva

2.

Bernard Myers is hereby confirmed as the sole successor Trustee of the Bernard

Myers.

Myers and Eva Myers Revocable Living Trust with all of the rights, duties and responsibilities
inherent in that position.
3.

The Birch Brothers' Complaint against Bernard Myers in his individual and

Trustee capacity is dismissed with prejudice.
4.

Elernard Myers' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the proceeds of

the sale of the Blackhawk Property is granted and the Court's prior order with respect to payment
of the proceeds of sale of the Blackhawk Property is hereby amended to reflect that the proceeds
shall be paid to Bernard Myers as Trustee of the Trust to be administered pursuant to the terms of
the Trust.
5.

The Birch Brothers' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.

6.

In light of the foregoing order, the Birch Brothers' Motion to Dismiss is moot.

17203.001/4850-0830-8482.1
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7.

Upon filing of an acceptance of appointment, Letters Testamentary shall be issued

to Bernard Myers.
DATED thisj f ^ a y of April, 2008

BY THE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on this jVf_-(iay °f April, 2008,1 caused to be mailed, first class,
postage prepaid, and by facsimile, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS'
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EVA L.
MYERS ESTATE AND DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT OF ALLAN G. BIRCH, GLENN L.
BIRCH AND JAMES BIRCH AGAINST BERNARD J. MYERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
NAMED TRUSTEE OF THE BERNARD J. MYERS AND EVA L. MYERS REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST AND DOES 1-4, to:
Edward M. Garrett
Garrett & Garrett
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, UT 84108

-QA/+J/.K. V^i^JjLi

J
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ADDENDUM 4
Affidavit of Attorney Fees

FILEB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

NOV 0 8 2007
SALT LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
EVA L. MYERS,
Deceased.

AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS ON PETITION TO
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN

BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and
Co-Grantor? Trustee and sole Qualified
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L.
Myers Revocable Living Trust,
Petitioner,

Probate No. 073901141
Judge Robert P. Faust

vs.
ALLAN G. BIRCH,
Respondent.
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
The undersigned, Matthew D. Cook of Parsons Behle & Latimer, upon his oath states as
follows:
1.

He is a member of the Utah State Bar and is licensed to practice law in the State

of Utah.
2.

His firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer, has been employed to represent Bernard J.

Myers, as named personal representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee
and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living
Trust, in this matter and he is familiar with the work that has been performed in this matter.
3.

In undertaking Bernard J. Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, Matthew D.

Cook ($175.00 per hour), Kent B. Alderman ($290.00 per hour), Laura S. Scott ($260.00 per
hour) and Jacqueline H. Pope (Paralegal) ($120.00 per hour) have performed the following
services:
I DATE

Attorney

HOURS

09/06/07

Kent Alderman

1.5

09/11/07

Kent Alderman

0.5

09/17/07

Matthew Cook

7.80

10172201

FEES

DESCRIPTION

|

435.00 Work on Determination of Whether or
not Notice of Interest in Real Property
can be treated as a wrongful lien; call
from attorney for Caldwell Banker
Regarding Facts on Notice of Interest.
145.00 Conference with M. Cook regarding
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien.
1365.00 Research and Draft Petition to Nullify j
Wrongful Lien and Motion for Hearing
Thereon. Interoffice Conference with
K. Owens regarding the same. Review |

2

09/18/07

Matthew Cook

2.70

472.50

09/19/07

Kent Alderman

0.4

116.00

09/20/07

Laura Scott

0.4

104.00

09/21/07

Laura Scott

1.80

468.00

09/22/07

Matthew Cook

4.80

840.00

09/24/07

Matthew Cook

2.90

507.50

1.5

435.00

1.00

120.00

0.5

145.00

09/25/07 j Kent Alderman j

09/25/07

Jackie Pope
(Paralegal)

10/02/07

1017220 1

Kent Alderman
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1 and Revise Petition;
Interoffice
conferences with L. Scott regarding the
same.
[interoffice
conference
with M.
Petrogeorge regarding required filings j
with respect to petition to nullify
wrongful lien; Interoffice conference
with K. Alderman regarding the same;
Review and Revise Pleadings related to
Wrongful Lien.
Conference with M. Cook regarding ]
information that lien may have been
withdrawn.
Revise and Edit Petition for Wrongful ]
! Lien and Motion for Hearing and
Supporting Affidavit.
Revise and Edit Petition for Wrongful j
Lien; Strategize with M. Cook
regarding the same.
Review, research and revise motion for 1
| hearing on wrongful lien; review and
revise petition to nullify wrongful lien;
review
and
revise
supporting
documents thereto.
Interoffice Conference with L. Scott j
regarding petition to nullify wrongful
lien and related pleadings; review and
edit petition to nullify wrongful lien in
accordance with conference with L.
Scott.
Review petition to reverse lien and 1
related affidavit; Interoffice conference
with Bernard Myers to review Petition
to Nullify and Affidavit and have him
execute the same.
Research SLC county recorders office
regarding parcel number 15-32-103014; obtain copies of documents
regarding the same.
Conference with Jane Myers and
Bernard Myers regarding Hearing on
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien
|

350

1 10/02/07 1 Matthew Cook 1

10/05/07 1 Kent Alderman

1.8 1

2.00

315.00 1 Draft Request to Submit Petition to
Nullify
wrongful
Lien;
Draft !
correspondence to Court regarding the
scheduling of the hearing; interoffice
conference with court clerk regarding
scheduling; Interoffice conference with
K. Alderman and M. Petrogeorge
regarding the same.
580.00 I Work on Affidavit for Bernard Myers; 1
make arrangements to cause execution
of the same and return of petition to
nullify petition to remove wrongful

1 lien.
10/08/07

Kent Alderman

2.00

10/09/07

Kent Alderman

3.00

10/10/07

Kent Alderman

2.0

10/11/07

Kent Alderman

4.00

10/11/07

Matthew Cook

2.40

10/13/07

Matthew Cook

3.70 |

10/15/07

Kent Alderman

3.50

10/29/07

Matthew Cook

1.10

11/06/07

Matthew Cook

4.6

1017220 1
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580.00 Work on preparation for hearing on 1
wrongful lien.
870.00 Work on preparation for hearing on
wrongful
lien
and
interoffice
conference with Bernard Myers in
preparation for hearing.
580.00 Work on preparation for hearing on
wrongful lien.
1160.00 Work on Preparation for hearing;
meeting with Bernard Myers and Gary
Myers to review preparation for
hearing and issues that may arise at the
hearing.
420.00 Review and Research Respondent's
objection to Petition to Nullify
Wrongful Lien.
647.50 Review and Research Object objection
to Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien;
Draft Hearing Outline in preparation
for hearing.
1015.00 Preparation for and attend hearing on
petition to nullify wrongful lien.
192.50 Research and Begin Drafting Findings
of Facts Conclusions of Law and Order
with Respect to Wrongful Lien.
805.00 Draft Affidavit for Attorney's Fees, 1
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order related to Petition for
Wrongful Lien.
j
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4.

In connection with the Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, affiant and his firm

have performed 55.9 hours of work and affiant believes a reasonable amount for these services to
be $11,738.00
5.

The attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Bernard J. Myers with respect to his

Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien are reasonable given the four factors outlined by the Utah
Supreme Court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and its progeny.
6.

Specifically, with respect to the first factor of what legal work was actually

performed, this Affidavit provides a detailed record of the legal work actually performed,
including the number of hours spent by each attorney and a paralegal for each task performed.
7.

The second factor addresses whether the work was reasonably necessary to

adequately prosecute the matter. In this case, Bernard J. Myers was required to file a detailed
Petition together with an Affidavit supporting each assertion made in such Petition. Moreover,
this matter was complicated by the fact that the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable
Living Trust (the "Trust") was the legal owner of the real property in question and the
Respondent was a contingent beneficiary of the Trust claiming a legal right to protect such
interest and the lien filed in this matter was a notice of interest in real Property.
8.

With respect to the third factor under Dixie State Bank and its progeny, the hourly

billing rates for the attorneys performing work on this matter are consistent with the hourly
billing rates customarily charged by attorneys practicing in Salt Lake County for legal services of
this type.
9.

Finally, with respect to the fourth factor, circumstances exist which require

consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Rule L5 of Professional

1017220 1
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Conduct. In addition to the skill, experience and reputation of the attorneys performing services
for Bernard J. Myers, such factors include the amount involved in this case, the results obtained,
and the time limitations imposed by the circumstances of this case (expedited hearing on Petition
to Nullify Wrongful Lien).
11.

Based on the above, the Court should award Bernard J. Myers, as Trustee and sole

Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust,
$11,738.00 in attorneys' fees. The Court should further award $1000.00 in statutory damages
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(2).
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J_

day of November, 2007.

KENT B. ALDERMAN
MATTHEW D. COOK
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner

1017220 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this _ |

day of November, 2007, I caused to be served by

United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN,
to:
Edward M. Garrett
2091 East 1300 South #201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

1017220 1
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ADDENDUM 5
First Lien Order (Awarding Full F^es)

-;?/>-l

KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV 2 9 2007

B,_£^ LAKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS,
DATE

\-y

P?

P/

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
EVA L. MYERS,

FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION TO
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN

Deceased.
Probate No. 073901141
Judge Robert P. Faust
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L.
Myers Revocable Living Trust,
Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN G. BIRCH,
Respondent.

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granti

JD26017772
1017225 2

pages:
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Petitioner Bernard J. Myers' ("Petitioner"), as named personal representative of the
Estate of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J.
Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien came for
oral argument before the Honorable Robert P. Faust on October 15, 2007. Petitioner

was

represented by Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Respondent Allan G. Birch
("Respondent") was represented by Edward M. Garret of Garrett & Garrett.
After considering the memoranda, petition, affidavit and exhibits submitted by the parties
and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust was the fee

simple owner of certain real property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt
Lake County, Utah 84120 (the "Property"), more particularly described as follows:
Lot 83, Western Acres Subdivision No.2, according to the official
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County Utah and with a Tax Parcel Number of
15321030140000.
2.

On August 15, 2007, Respondent recorded a Notice of Interest in Real Property

("Notice of Interest") on the Property. The Notice of Interest was recorded in Salt Lake County
as Entry No. 10194876 in Book 9504 at Page 1656.
3.

On August 27, 2007, Petitioner gave Respondent written notice that the Notice of

Interest was a wrongful lien and requested that Respondent remove the Notice of Interest.
Respondent did not remove the Notice of Interest within ten (10) days of the written request.

1017225 2
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4.

Pursuant to the terms of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living

Trust (the "Trust") Respondent has a future interest in the Trust, which is subject to total
divestment and does not hold a vested interest in the Property.
5.

Respondent does not have the right to possess, use, or convey the Property and

therefore is not an owner of the Property.
6.

The Notice of Interest is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document

signed by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c)
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this
state.
7.

The Notice of Interest was not filed in connection with an action affecting the title

to or the right of possession of the Property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq.

because it is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the
property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or contained
in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state.
2.

The Notice of Interest is not a valid lis pendens because it was not filed in

connection with an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of the Property.
3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4, Respondent is liable to Petitioner for

damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
Therefore, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing,
hereby ORDERS:

1017225 2
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1.

Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien is hereby granted in its entirety and

judgment is hereby entered:
(a)

Declaring that the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien on the Property and

therefore void ab initio; and
2.

The Notice of Interest is hereby released from the property.

3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded statutory

damages in the amount of $1000.00.
4.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded his attorneys'

fees and costs, in the amount of

/ / , ~7 3S

as established by the Affidavit of

Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien submitted to the Court.

BY THE COURT:

_

Honorable Robert B. Fatist
Third Judicial District^obtf
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

1 tVday of November, 2007, I caused to be served by

United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS
PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN, to:
Edward M. Garrett
2091 East 1300 South #201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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ADDENDUM 6
Second Lien Order (Reducing Fees)

*. 'w M

KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034)
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649)
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
APR - 2 2008
LAKE COUNTY

By

T<Ls
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROBATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
EVA L. MYERS,

FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION TO
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN

Deceased.
Probate No. 073901141
Judge Robert P. Faust
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L.
Myers Revocable Living Trust,

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE

Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN G. BIRCH,
Respondent.

Findings of Faci conclusions of Law and Order Grant!

JD26437461

073901141 BIRCH,ALLANG

pages:
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Petitioner Bernard J. Myers' ("Petitioner"), as named personal representative of the
Estate of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J.
Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien came for
oral argument before the Honorable Robert P. Faust on October 15, 2007. Petitioner

was

represented by Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Respondent Allan G. Birch
("Respondent") was represented by Edward M. Garret of Garrett & Garrett.
After considering the memoranda, petition, affidavit and exhibits submitted by the parties
and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust was the fee

simple owner of certain real property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt
Lake County, Lftah 84120 (the "Property"), more particularly described as follows:
Lot 83, Western Acres Subdivision No.2, according to the official
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County Utah and with a Tax Parcel Number of
15321030140000.
2.

On August 15, 2007, Respondent recorded a Notice of Interest in Real Property

("Notice of Interest") on the Property. The Notice of Interest was recorded in Salt Lake County
as Entry No. 10194876 in Book 9504 at Page 1656.
3.

On August 27, 2007, Petitioner gave Respondent written notice that the Notice of

Interest was a wrongful lien and requested that Respondent remove the Notice of Interest.
Respondent did not remove the Notice of Interest within ten (10) days of the written request.

1017225.2
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4.

Pursuant to the terms of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living

Trust (the "Trust") Respondent has a future interest in the Trust, which is subject to total
divestment and does not hold a vested interest in the Property.
5.

Respondent does not have the right to possess, use, or convey the Property and

therefore is not an owner of the Property.
6.

The Notice of Interest is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document

signed by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c)
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this
state.
7.

The Notice of Interest was not filed in connection with an action affecting the title

to or the right of possession of the Property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
L

The Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq.

because it is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the
property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or contained
in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state.
2.

The Notice of Interest is not a valid lis pendens because it was not filed in

connection with an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of the Property.
3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4, Respondent is liable to Petitioner for

damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
Therefore, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing,
hereby ORDERS:
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Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien is hereby granted in its entirety and

judgment is hereby entered:
(a)

Declaring that the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien on the Property and

therefore void ab initio: and
2.

The Notice of Interest is hereby released from the property.

3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9 1(2)* Petitioner is*hereby awarded statutory

damages,m the amount of $1000.00:
4.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded his attorneys'

fees and costs, in the amount of

1

tOO »QC> , as established by the Affidavit of

Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien submitted to the Court. C*A*'
?<\&*ct,\ Uyr i^z.
Cc**H.

BY THE C

Honorable R&
Third Judicial
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

1

\W
day of November, 2007, I caused to be served by

United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS
PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN, to:
Edward M. Garrett
2091 East 1300 South #201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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